So far, there have been two major failures at the level of national security which need to be rectified. Their practical solution is expected to begin in 2022.
China has occupied 1,000 square miles of strategically important Indian territory in the Depsang Plains in eastern Ladakh. The response of the Narendra Modi government, apart from talking to China, has been to restore the status quo, which is targeting. India’s China policy needs to be toughened, in which there should be a ‘likes the like’ thinking. India needs strategic alliances with Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, as Beijing has done with Pakistan.
China’s access to the Indian market should be limited
Market access to China should be limited in the same way that Indian exporters in China have to face. The flow of Chinese automobiles, mobile telephony goods and light manufacturers should be stopped. If the BJP-led government wants to replace China as the ‘workshop’ in the world, India must start from home by reducing regulatory and bureaucratic controls.
Army’s structuring should be better
The strict policy should be met with appropriate military force structuring. Even though the Indian Army is capable of neutralizing China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with a large presence, it lacks the capability to reclaim lost territory.
This capability can only be acquired by the three Offensive Mountain Corps (OMCs) for continuous active or offensive action and can become economically viable only if the Army’s three Armored Strike Corps are suddenly exposed to any action by Pakistan. be turned into a Singer Composite Corps to deal with. Three Armored Strike Corps is only good for a simple front against Pakistan. The remaining two Strike Corps need to be converted for the mountains, which use light tanks for higher operations.
Together with the Panagarh based OMC (XVII Corps), these two formations will provide a means of strike/counterattack against the PLA and together with the existing defensively positioned mountain divisions, will form a formidable fighting force to blunt the PLA’s edge across the Himalayas , as well as reducing China’s influence in the region.
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Lack of clear thinking in self-reliant policy
Another failure relates to the self-reliant policy, which reveals its vague thinking. Will the country be able to become self-reliant if foreign supplier companies manufacture their products in India or in fact just assemble? This is actually the ‘screwdriving’ level of manufacturing technology of Defense Public Sector Units (DPSUs) like HAL, Mazagon Dockyard and Ordnance Factories where she is stuck for the last 60 years.
They are used to license manufacturing contracts wherein they have to open imported fully knocked-down kits and semi knocked-down kits. She then tightens the various components and assemblies with a screwdriver to achieve the weapon system. Also advanced technologies related to Weapons Payload, Propulsion, Situational Awareness, Avionics, Complex Fire Control Systems, Communications etc. are transferred in just one ‘Black Boxes’.
The process is labeled “indigenous production” and ‘Made in India’ warships, submarines and combat aircraft are claimed to have 80 per cent indigenous content in proportion by weight and not by value. , because more high-end technologies account for 70 per cent or more of the total contract value.
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Private defense companies depend on sub-contracts
Thus DPSUs are a burden in defense related production. So far no government has shown the will and economic sense to allow the elite private sector to compete with DPSUs in large military procurement deals to join the national effort. As a result, good companies with a skilled workforce are dependent on sub-contracts from these DPSUs.
Consider the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft. HAL has an annual production capacity of 16 aircraft; The second assembly line would double that, but that didn’t stop the IAF from extending the induction period of the 83 Tejas. The solution is the need for multiple Tejas production lines, for which DRDO will have to transfer the source code to several private sector companies so that they can build and produce the aircraft in bulk for the IAF and exports. With this, where the Indian airspace industry will be able to grow, but also good jobs will be created and good revenue will come in this sector. But who thinks far in New Delhi?
Bharat Karnad is Distinguished Fellow at the United Services Institution and Emeritus Professor of National Securities Studies at the Central for Policy Research.
These are his personal views and do not represent the stand of this publication.
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