Birmingham: Is Russia now headed by someone who would consider using nuclear weapons without major concern? With regard to Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has given some very big signals that he is ready to cross that strategic boundary. Russia and its allies Belarus were engaged in nuclear drills just days before the invasion of Ukraine.
In announcing the attack, Putin explicitly referred to Russia as “one of the most powerful nuclear powers in the world”. The Russian president appears to reserve the nuclear option as a response to a “direct attack on his country”. But he warned that those who try to “stop us” in Ukraine could face consequences “more than any they have faced in history”.
read also
It was feared that Russia might also take precautionary measures. In his broadcast to the Russian people on February 21, Putin also suggested – falsely – that the Ukrainian leadership was trying to obtain nuclear weapons of its own. The concerns increased. Putin announced on 27 February that Russia’s nuclear forces were put on high alert.
The Russian president claimed it was a response to “aggressive statements made against our country” by “senior officials of the leading NATO countries”. Speculation on that occasion centered on how the Russian leadership was alarmed by the severity of economic sanctions and slow progress on the battlefield. Was Putin’s order a “distraction”, as Britain’s Defense Secretary Ben Wallace described. did? Or was it, more worryingly, a sign of steps Putin could take with defeat ahead?
Russia’s Nuclear Thinking Part of the answer to these questions lies in Russian military strategy. Known conditions force us to make some assumptions about how Russia might use nuclear weapons. In this context, it is useful to distinguish between tactical and sub-strategic (tactical-operational) nuclear weapons. Strategic nuclear weapons play two major roles. First, they act as a deterrent, as the ultimate guarantee of survival for the Russian state when faced with an existential threat, including a catastrophic attack by another nuclear power.
Second, this range of weapons helps Moscow to wage war under favorable conditions. The mere threat of using strategic nuclear capabilities provides a powerful tool to keep unwanted parties out of conflict, allowing Russia to pursue active military operations by other means. Meanwhile, sub-strategic nuclear weapons have played a changing role in Russian military doctrine. In the 1990s and early 2000s, these capabilities were at the heart of Russia’s military potential as Moscow sought to compensate for the structural shortcomings of its conventional forces.
Some Russian strategists suggest that limited nuclear use would be a rational proposition. A comprehensive program of defense reforms launched in 2008 restored Russia’s conventional power and removed the role of strategic-operational nuclear weapons. There has recently been a debate around the so-called “escalate to de-escalate doctrine”, according to which Russia may use strategic nuclear weapons early in the conflict to achieve a quick victory.
However, this hypothesis rests on untenable grounds. Russian statements do not provide any definite evidence that such a position actually exists in its military doctrine. It also rests on two false grounds: that conventional force is insufficient (perhaps once has been, but not now) and that nuclear retaliation is unlikely (this may never have been assumed in a world hardened to nuclear deterrence). (agency)